Introduction

In January 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told the European Parliament’s Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Security and Defence (SEDE) bluntly: “If anyone thinks the EU, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming”.

The remark triggered frustration across European political circles, yet it reflected a pragmatic reality: the EU and its Member States remain structurally dependent on the United States across critical military domains, from strategic enablers to command-and-control structures. This dependency has had tangible consequences in Ukraine. While Ukrainian forces consume on average 7,000 artillery rounds per day, EU production capacity remains capped at around two million rounds per year. Missile procurement, meanwhile, can take between one and five years due to industrial fragmentation, slow procedures, and limited surge capacity.

Admittedly, the debate on European defence autonomy is not new. In 2017, then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for a ‘Europe of Defence’, and in 2018 Chancellor Angela Merkel urged Europeans to ‘take our destiny into our own hands’. Yet the current geopolitical context is unprecedented in both speed and intensity. Conventional warfare has returned to Europe’s borders; EU intelligence assessments point to a potential Russian attack against an EU Member State by 2030; and the US has made clear—most recently in its National Security Strategy—that support for European defence will be increasingly critical but limited. At the same time, transatlantic relations have become less predictable, as illustrated by recurring US debates on NATO’s Article 5 commitments and tensions surrounding Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark.

Against this backdrop, EU defence autonomy is no longer an aspirational objective but a strategic necessity. In February 2026, Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius called before the European Parliament for the establishment of a genuine European Defence Union. Defence autonomy has since become a central pillar of the Commission’s 2026 Work Programme, with President Ursula von der Leyen urging Europeans to ‘seize this opportunity and build a new independent Europe’ at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos.

Money is no Longer the Core Problem

Contrary to the past three decades, the EU’s central defence problem today is neither a lack of ambition nor a lack of resources, but a deficit of leadership. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, EU Member States have increased defence spending by nearly 50%, reaching €381 billion in 2025—2.1% of EU GDP and the highest level since 1993. By comparison, the US spends approximately $845 billion (3.2% of GDP), while Russia invests around $150 billion, equivalent to roughly 7% of its GDP.

Moreover, the 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members have committed to investing 5% of GDP in defence by 2035, including 3.5% for core defence requirements. If implemented, this would add close to €600 billion annually, bringing European defence spending close to US levels. At EU level, the ReArm Europe Plan has unlocked up to €800 billion over four years to support stock replenishment, critical infrastructure protection, and the integration of new technologies into defence.

Yet resources alone cannot generate autonomy. Credible and legitimate leadership cannot be purchased; it must be organised.

Leadership as the Central Challenge

EU defence autonomy ultimately hinges on leadership—put simply, on who decides what, when, and under whose authority. Three interrelated leadership questions remain unresolved.

First, political leadership: who authorises—and finances—the use of force?

Second, military leadership: who coordinates, commands, and deploys troops under mutual defence obligations?

Third, democratic leadership: who provides legitimacy, accountability, and oversight for military action?

The EU currently offers no clear answer to any of these questions. Historically, Member States delegated all three to the US through NATO structures, most notably via the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—a position traditionally held by a US general appointed by the US President and approved by the US Senate and the North Atlantic Council. As Washington gradually steps back from its traditional role as Europe’s security guarantor, this leadership vacuum has become increasingly untenable. In crisis scenarios, decisions must be taken in minutes, not through protracted intergovernmental bargaining.

Three Leadership Pathways for European Defence

Three realistic leadership models could underpin a more autonomous European defence.

The first is intergovernmental leadership, centred on a Franco-German tandem. Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and defence investor, and France, as the EU’s only nuclear power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, are uniquely positioned to provide joint strategic leadership within the Council of the EU. Under this model, decision-making would remain primarily intergovernmental, with accountability ensured through national parliaments. While politically feasible in the short term, this approach risks reinforcing perceptions of hierarchy among Member States and provides only limited democratic legitimacy at EU level.

The second pathway is supranational leadership within the EU’s institutional framework. Strategic decisions would be coordinated by the Commission President, operational command entrusted to a rotating four-star officer from a Member State, and democratic oversight exercised by the European Parliament. This model would enhance coherence, speed, and legitimacy, but would require a significant political willingness to centralise authority in a domain traditionally guarded by national sovereignty, likely through treaty reforms.

The third option is a federalised EU–NATO model, functionally linking European defence autonomy with NATO structures. Echoing the logic of the failed European Defence Community of 1954, this approach would see the European Commission assume responsibility for force planning, capability development, and organisation, while operational deployment would remain under NATO’s SACEUR, subject to European parliamentary oversight. This model has gained relevance as NATO leadership has gradually shifted towards European allies. In February 2026, European states assumed command of all three NATO Joint Force Commands for the first time, signalling a growing European role in NATO’s conventional deterrence posture. Moreover, the US is increasingly expected to enable European Allies to assume primary responsibility for NATO’s conventional defence posture by 2027.

Is Federalism the Solution?

Calls for a more federal European defence architecture have intensified. In February 2026, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi argued that Europe must move ‘from confederation to federation’ in response to a deteriorating global order. A federal-style defence union would undoubtedly provide clarity of command, shared burden-sharing, and a coherent strategic culture across all 27 Member States.

Yet political reality remains more fragmented. Existing initiatives such as the Strategic Compass and deliberations within the Foreign Affairs Council have delivered modest outcomes: a 5,000-strong EU rapid deployment capacity of limited military relevance and declaratory commitments that fall short of establishing the EU as a credible security actor.

In the short term, more incremental approaches may prove more viable. Formats outside the EU’s constitutional framework—such as the E5+ or the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine—have demonstrated a capacity to deliver tangible results. Building on this logic, Commissioner Kubilius has floated the idea of a European Security Council, where major Member States could coordinate informally and act without unanimity constraints. While such differentiated cooperation could enable rapid responses and gradually expand consensus, it also carries the risk of institutional fragmentation and the emergence of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ Member States.

While EU defence independence will not be achieved through funding alone, EU Member States must make clear political choices on leadership and legitimacy. Whether pursued through intergovernmental coordination, supranational governance, or a federalised EU–NATO framework, the EU must confront the leadership question head-on. Without doing so, EU defence autonomy will remain an ambition rather than an operational reality.