A Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional Perspectives
A new report by DCU Brexit Institute Director, Professor Federico Fabbrini, entitled “A Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional Perspectives” explores the legal basis and instruments available to the European Union for pursing integration of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Professor Fabbrini explores in depth the original legal and institutional architecture underpinning the EMU and recent crisis’ response to it, namely, the Euro Crisis. The report examines in detail the proposals to date for overcoming the asymmetry in the legal framework of the EMU from the perspective of High-Level Groups, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States.
A comparative perspective on fiscal federalization is discussed in the report with the United States and Switzerland as the case studies. Chapter 5 of the report analyses the case for the European Union under the heading of ‘Fiscal Federalism without a Political Federation in the EU’. The chapter evaluates legal, financial, accountability and the role of parliamentary scrutiny in addition to viewing Brexit as an opportunity to reforming the European architecture of economic governance.
The report draws conclusions by quoting European Centre Bank President Mario Draghi at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the euro, “Today, our duty is to complete what we started two decades ago” when the euro was introduced as a tangible instrument of political union in Europe (Fabbrini, 2019: 25)”.
Professor Fabbrini is scheduled to present the report to the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs on Thursday 7th March 2019. View full report